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Theories o f Legal Argumentation and Concepts 
of Law. An Approximation
by Massimo La Torre
I .
I. 1. Until the Eighteenth century an important place in a 
lawyer's training was reserved for education in reasoning about the 
rules or principles o f law. This reasoning was indeed understood more 
as rhetoric, as the art o f the orator, as the capacity to exercise 
persuasion. Nonetheless, the less pragmatic, more formal aspect o f legal 
discourse was not neglected. Little treatises on "legal logic" burgeoned, 
generally, though not only, applications o f Aristotelian logic to the 
structure o f the arguments used in legal dispute51. And it may be 
recalled that Vico was teacher o f rhetoric, professor eloquentiae, in the 
law faculty o f Naples University, though as we know he never 
succeeded, to his great vexation, in landing a post teaching civil law. 
Rhetoric was, however, a qualifying subject at the time in the 
curriculum of the law student.
Everything changed in a way I do not hesitate to term 
dramatic with the assertion o f Enlightenment ideology and the great 
codifications, especially the French one, since the Prussian one was still 
very indulgent towards the corporative social structure and plurality of 
legal orders handed down by the class State, and the Austrian one still 
left ample room open for so-called natural reason, i.e. assessment in 
accordance with extra-positive principles (recall in this connection 
Article Seven o f the ABGB, the 1811 Austrian civil code, written by 
Franz von Zeiller, a Kantian jurist much criticized for his "philosophical" 
attitude by the historicist Friedrich Carl von Savigny). It was, then, the 
French codification and the Enlightenment ideology it was nourished on 
that, so to speak, made the difference.
This is not the place to dwell on the history o f the French 
codification and its difficult gestation, on the drafts by Cambacérès and 
Portalis. Suffice it to recall that thanks to elimination o f the o r ig inal 
Article Nine in the Portalis Draft, which provided for recourse to equity 
where the law was silent, the dogma of the completeness o f the legal 1





























































































system was asserted2. Nor should it be forgotten that in 1793 the 
Convention had decreed the abolition of the Law Faculty, an extreme 
manifestation o f suspicion o f the jurist as interpreter ("traduttore 
traditore") o f the law, and o f maximal trust in the clearness and 
exhaustiveness o f the legislator's work.
Note that when speaking of the legal system in Enlightenment, 
legal positivist language, what is meant is exclusively the set o f statutes 
explicitly issued by the legislative authority, that is, by the 
representative o f popular sovereignty. The order's completeness here 
means, then, completeness o f the system of laws. Put in other words, 
the Enlightenment and the Napoleonic codification marked a move from 
a theory o f law centred on arguments, however heterogeneous, 
frequently mutually contradictory and unsystematized, to a theory of 
law centred round the notion of source. What made headway was what 
a British scholar, Joseph Raz, has called "source theory"3, and Ronald 
Dworkin has termed "conventionalism"4.
But i f  there is a source, some sort o f fact, from which the law 
springs, its application becomes primarily a question o f finding the 
source itself. The judge's role is thus conceived — in line with 
Enlightenment suspicion o f the figure of the judge and desire to make it 
the mere "mouthpiece o f the law” — as that o f a sort o f natural 
scientist. In this perspective the judge’s activity becomes eminently 
cognitive; he is regarded as using theoretical reason, not practical 
reason, that is, "descriptive" statements, not prescriptive evaluations. It 
was believed that the judge should operate solely in syllogistic fashion, 
with as major premise rigorously the law, and as minor premise the 
fact, the conclusion being the verdict5.
So strong was the model o f the syllogism6 — a syllogism, I 
repeat, seen essentially as a purely cognitive operation — that the
2 See N. BOBBIO, 11 positivismo giuridico, 2nd ed., Torino 1979, pp. 79 ff.
3 See J. RAZ, The Authority o f  Law, Oxford 1979, chapter 3, and J. Raz, On the 
Autonomy o f  Legal Reasoning, in "Ratio Juris", pp. 1 ff. Vol. 5 (1992).
4 See R. DWORKIN, Law's Empire, II ed., London 1986, pp. 14 ff.
5 Read the famous fourth chapter of Cesare Beccaria's "Of Crimes and 
Punishments". For German doctrine on the subject, at any rate as far as last 
century goes, see R. OGOREK, Richterkonig Oder Subsumtionsautomat? Zur 
Justiztheorie im 19. Jahrhundert, Frankfurt am Main 1986, passim.
6 On this see L GIANFORMAGGIO, Modelli di ragionamento giuridico. Modello 




























































































separation o f powers itself and the rule of law were conceived of as a 
consequence of the model. Kant, but Condorcet before him too, affirm 
that judicial power is to legislative power as the conclusion o f a 
syllogism is to its major premise7. The novelty in this model is however 
not so much the importance given the syllogism. That is something not 
even such a confused, lax jurist as Manzoni's Azzeccagarbugli could do 
without. Use o f the syllogism is in a certain sense a platitude. To speak 
is already to function syllogistically, at least where a term with an 
inevitably general extension — a meaning — is applied to a specific 
object, thus denoting the latter through the term. (I f  I call this table 
"table", I am operating syllogistically with the term "table", reaching the 
conclusion o f designating the object in front o f me as "table").
It is not, then, the syllogism as such that is the novelty in the 
Enlightenment and legal-positivist model. The novelty lies in what it is 
held ought to constitute the major premise o f the syllogism, and in the 
qualities attributed to it. The major premise is the law, and this is 
already regarded as clear, its meaning as evident, as unambiguously 
given by the letter o f the law itself. The novelty lies further in the 
epistemological, let us say, quality attributed to the judicial syllogism: it 
is conceived of as an essentially cognitive operation, as a theoretical 
rather than practical syllogism. Very suggestive in this connection is a 
passage from one of the founding fathers of legal positivist dogmatics, 
Paul Laband : "Die rechtliche Entscheidung besteht in der Subsumtion 
eines gegebenen Tatbestandes unter das geltende Recht, sie ist wie 
jeder logische Schluft vom Willen unabhangig; es besteht keine Freiheit 
der EntschlieRung, ob die Folgerung eintreten soil Oder nicht; sie ergibt 
sich - wie man sagt - von selbst, mit innerer Notwendigkeit"8.
I. 2. At this point I feel it needful to mention one fundamental 
distinction in philosophy and theory of knowledge: between theoretical 
rationality and practical rationality, or, i f  you will, between two 
different models o f reason. Very approximately, we may say that 
theoretical reason is the set o f arguments that justify descriptive
Problemi e tendenze attuali (Studi dedicati a Norberto Bobbio), ed. by U. Scarpelli, 
Milano 1983, pp 131 ff.
7 Read I. KANT, Metaphysischc Anfangsgriinde der Rechtslehre, Metaphysik 
der Sitten, Krster Teil, ed. by B. Ludwig, Hamburg 1986, § 45, p. 129.





























































































statements, assertions about states o f affairs. Practical reason consists 
instead o f a set o f arguments that justify prescriptive or normative 
statements, preferences, value judgements or norms. This distinction 
obviously has meaning only if  it is assumed that descriptive and 
normative statements are not semantically and epistemologically 
homologous; that is, if it is assumed that the meaning and rightness of a 
value statement are not deducible from the meaning and rightness o f a 
descriptive statement, and vice versa.
Theoretical or descriptive reason or rationality can be reduced 
to two series o f arguments: (a) the basically deductive formal ones, 
founded on certain principles and logical operations; (b) the material 
ones, basically inductive, founded on empirical observations and data 
from experience. Formal arguments serve to develop material or 
substantive arguments. They are, then, auxiliary in relation to the 
latter. This means that theoretical rationality, at least in the sphere of 
empirical knowledge, is fundamentally based on experiential data. 
Within the province o f the so-called formal sciences, mathematics for 
instance, one might by contrast do without such experiential data or 
observational situations of empirical events. Here, principles and logical 
operations suffice.
But practical reason, the reason that justifies value judgements or 
deontic statements, does not precisely coincide with theoretical reason. 
This is because experiential data and logical operations are not enough 
to supply us with indications o f preference and guides to action. There 
is a need for a further type o f premise, for criteria or normative 
principles.
Having clarified the sense in which I use the terms "theoretical 
reason" and "practical reason", I shall now move to the conclusion of 
this first section. We have seen that it was with codifications and legal 
positivism that the syllogistic model, or better a theory o f law centred 
around the notion o f source, became what dominated legal 
epistemology on the European continent. But in the last few decades 
this model has, after a century of ups and downs, fallen into deep crisis. 
This is motivated by two principal factors: (i) one eminent theoretical, 
(ii) the other more contingent and historical.
(i) The great theoretical problem with what I here for brevity's 
sake call the "syllogistic model" is that it does not fit the reality o f the 
operations done by the judge in applying the law. The law cannot be 




























































































What is applied is instead a provision o f law which is often constructed 
by gathering, combining and breaking down various legal texts9, and 
reconstructed by attributing a meaning to these materials. These 
accordingly have to be interpreted, and handled logically.
Then comes the fact to apply the law to. This has to be regarded as 
legally relevant. This is a decision that cannot be derived simply from 
applying the law to the fact, since the reconstruction or indeed 
construction o f the legally relevant fact often precedes consideration of 
what provision is appropriate to the facts. A legally relevant fact is 
something more than an empirical fact.
But the decisive problem that explains why the syllogistic 
model is (theoretically) in crisis is that even where a clear provision is 
available, appropriate to the case under consideration, and the factual 
elements have been adequately classified and tested, it is not always 
possible to reach a single correct answer. The syllogism allows various 
conclusions, all formally (logically and legally) correct. For the norms, 
from their generality and abstractness, often lend themselves to 
multiple concrete manifestations. On the other hand, it is hard to be 
sure that all the factual circumstances relevant for constructing the 
minor premise have been brought into consideration. These difficulties 
worsen still further in those legislations, like our contemporary ones, 
where special laws abound, and codifications take on even the 
character o f residual or auxiliary provisions, in which moral and 
political principles are explicitly adopted in constitutions and other 
legal documents.
(ii) The syllogistic model further faces more contingent problems 
deriving from  the evolution o f contemporary legal systems. Two 
aspects o f this evolution have just been mentioned: the proliferation of 
ad hoc statutes, the so-called "motorization of legislation", and the move 
from the rule o f law in which the "fundamental" is the principle of 
legality and hence the reservation o f law (for some areas like 
individual "rights"), to the constitutional State, in which rights are taken 
to be a "material" hierarchically superior to the law, and the principle 
o f equality before the law is reinterpreted as a principle of 
reasonableness or substantive rationality10.
9 See what is written in this connection by G. TARELLO, L'interpretazione della 
legge, Milano 1980, pp.31-32.
10 In this connection 1 wish to recall the words of an outstanding jurist, the 




























































































In this context o f problems the most important crisis factor is 
undoubtedly the growing mass-juridification of our legal systems, in 
turn a response to the growing decline o f the law. The latter, 
understood as a general norm and abstract rational expression 
motivated by a legitimate instance of popular sovereignty, is in deep 
crisis. This is so because it is no longer so general and abstract, but 
increasingly particular and concrete, an ad hoc law or "mini-law". And 
it is increasingly less justified and rational because the instance 
producing it has lost much of its legitimacy because o f its inability to 
pursue the general interest in transparent fashion. We are seeing what 
has been called the "juridification" of social life, or also, in Habermas's 
words, the "colonization o f the life-world", but this over-production of 
laws and decrees, this instrumental and "situational" use o f law, does 
not do any good to the legislator's prestige. The mass production of laws 
necessarily escapes discussion o f principles or pondered public debate, 
obeying instead more corporative, not to say clientelist, logics. The 
"public reason" thus driven out o f legislative assemblies is often 
transferred to courtrooms, and democracy — in order to escape the 
corrupt and corrupting logics of part clientelism and technobureaucratic 
opacity -- tends to become, so to speak, "judicial"11.
It is today the judge that is put forward as the new centre of 
the legal system, no longer the legislative power, like it or not. And in 
the judge's view  central importance inevitably attaches to the 
procedure whereby the decision is arrived at. Here, the law is not 
enough, other criteria o f choice have to be resorted to.
democratic Spain: "Legal reason is the projection o f practical reason. It never 
operates in a vacuum. It proceeds from a universe o f values, principles and 
concepts developed in positive law and seeks to solve problems posed by the 
interpretation of norms (the supreme one being the Constitution) or by the 
doubtful classification of individual situations arising in social reality in the 
framework of the normative system. The constitutional judge has to solve problems 
that in the last analysis consist in a conflict among various ways of understanding 
and applying the Constitution. The Court, as constitutional organ of the State, 
solves political problems through legal argument: it is legal reason that is its 
instrument, not the reason of (or of the) State, or of the Government or of this or 
that party”(F. TOMAS Y VAUENTE, A orillas del Estado, Madrid 1996, p. 266).
11 For a comparative perspective on this phenomenon see C. GUARNIERl, P. 




























































































Also to be stressed is the growing part played by constitutional 
law in many democratic systems. But constitutional law by its nature 
operates not so much with laws as with principles and with rights. 
These are often balanced using argumentative operations that are more 
complex than a mere either-or. Constitutional justice, in order to justify 
its own decisions, must then use argumentative strategies much more 
highly structured than in the syllogistic model12.
Moreover, in the presence of the possibility o f constitutional 
review of a law, it may also be considered that over and above the 
differences between centralized and diffused systems, every judge 
(whatever be the organ or instance he belongs to), insofar as he may 
accept a finding of unconstitutionality, or ask for it to be made, assumes 
a power o f assessing the constitutionality of norms, and thus in a way 
himself becomes a "guardian o f the constitution". The argumentative 
style proper to constitutional justice consequently spreads throughout 
the whole judicial system. Here, then, is a further reason for the rebirth 
and the prospering o f theories o f legal reasoning turned towards 
determining a broad spectrum o f criteria for the rightness o f a judicial 
decision.
II.
IL 1. Since the Second World War, two pieces o f research have 
foreshadowed the new theories o f legal reasoning: (A ) Theodor 
Viehweg's topica and (B) Chaim Perelman's "nouvelle rhétorique".
(A ) There are three main ways in which topica may be 
understood: (a) as a technique of searching for premises in practical 
discourse, in discourse directed towards taking a decision, in which, 
accordingly, legal discourse would only be one element; (b) as a theory 
of the content o f the premises o f practical discourse; (c) finally, as a 
theory o f the use o f those premises. In the first case topica suggests 
collecting and classifying the various types o f argument used in legal 
discourse, so as to arrive at a sort o f catalogue o f topoi. These, as Alexy 
rightly notes13, are however fairly inhomogeneous: ranging from
12 For the Italian case see R. BIN, Diritti e argomenti, Milano 1992.
13 See R. ALEXY, Theorie (1er juristischen Argumentation. Die Théorie des 
rationalen Diskurses a Is Theorie der juristischen Begriindung, 2nd ed., Frankfurt 
am main 1991, pp.39 ff. Cf. also J. A. GARCIA AMADO, Teorias de la tòpica juridica, 




























































































principles like lex posterior derogat priori to the interpretative 
technique o f referring back, say, to the legislator's intentions.
From the viewpoint o f the theory o f the content o f the 
premises o f practical discourse, topica denies that they can be true or 
false, and trusts to the concept o f likelihood or plausibility. As a theory 
o f the use o f premises in practical legal discourse, topica prescribes the 
rule o f considering the various viewpoints, and is based on the 
principle that debate is "die einzige Kontrollinstanz", the sole check on 
the correctness o f decisions.
Topica, just as is the case with rhetoric, concentrates too much 
on the pragmatic side, on the effects or "results" o f reasoning. Putting it 
better, while rhetoric is a technique aimed at reaching certain effects 
on an audience, namely pursuading it, topica is a technique directed to 
securing particular results on the speaker: the finding by him o f the 
arguments he needs. Topica is, then, oriented to the conduct o f the 
orator, viz. whoever has to or wishes to put forward or articulate a 
discourse or an argument, that is, the utterer o f a linguistic 
communication, partly irrespective o f the presence or reactions of his 
audience, or o f the recipients o f the message. What matters — at least 
in topics as developed starting from Cicero's work -- is that the speaker 
should in fact have at his disposal the arguments, whatever be their 
value (truth or rightness): just as rhetoric is basically interested in the 
orator's actually persuading his audience, irrespective o f the formal 
quality o f his theses. Thus, topics ends up being hard to deal with from 
a viewpoint o f logic and argumentation1*', and is reduced to a sort o f 
apology for the orator, just as rhetoric often degenerates into a sort of 
audience psychology.
Moreover, topics, by starting from topoi, from  generally 
accepted "commonplaces", before any further epistemological check on 
their content, risks becoming a bearer in the theoretical and normative 
sphere of traditional concepts outwith reflexive verification, and hence 
of prejudices14 5, and in the artistic sphere o f ideas o f no originality at all,
14 Recall Viehweg's insistency in rejecting the possibility o f articulating topoi 
in logical chains: "Lange Folgerungen vertragen sich nichl mit ihrer Funktjcm, 
das logische Gewicht der von ihnen aufgebauten Begriffs- oder Salzgcfiige blejbt 
deshalb stels gering" (TIL V1E1IWEG, Topik und Jurisprudent. Ein Beitrag zur 
rechlswisscnschaftlichen Grundlagenforschung, 5th ed., Munchcn 1974, p.38).
15 Something closer to topics is, accordingly, the hermeneutic proposal of 




























































































of canons, not just outwith the artist's creativity and inventiveness, but 
even often incompatible with them. It is certainly no coincidence that 
the term "commonplace" has taken on a highly negative coloration in 
the last few centuries.
"Topics", in the version sketched out by Viehweg, nonetheless 
has two important merits. The first is that o f subjecting to criticism the 
traditional mode o f procedure o f so-called legal science based on 
"institutes", in short, on a doubtful ontology, on an essentialism 
according to which there are, behind legal concepts, substances that the 
lawyer can "distil" and then "combine" anew. "Denn hier werden sehr 
haufig Produkte der Rechtssprache als auliersprachliche, von der 
Rechtssprache lediglich abgebildete Gegenstande vorgestellt. Auf diese 
Weise schuf man zuweilen selbstandige Gegenstandsfelder, die das 
Rechtsdenken anzutreffen vermeinte und dementsprechend beschrieb, 
obgleich es sie selbst herstellte. In der deutschen Jurisprudenz hat der 
geniale Ihering die krassesten Exempel dieser Art geliefert"16. It is this 
criticism, more or less explicit, that sparked o f f  the recent 
argumentative revolution in legal knowledge, which prefers to speak of 
"arguments" and "reasons" rather than o f "sources", and o f "principles" 
rather than o f "institutes”. This is, i f  you wish, the revenge o f 
"philosophers" like Franz von Zeiller over "historians" like Friedrich Carl 
von Savigny. The other merit is that o f stressing the procedure of 
balancing, o f "pros and cons", as typical o f practical reasoning and of 
legal reasoning in particular.
(B) Much more articulate is Chaim Perelman's theory. After 
an initial period when he defended rigidly non-cognitivist metaethical 
postulates, and trusted in order to "test" the rationality o f practical 
decisions purely to formal justice, summarized in the principle of 
treating like cases alike, he then sought, starting from the ancient 
tradition, to reconstruct techniques enabling us to go beyond the 
determination o f dissent, the sole end-point o f radical non-cognitivism. 
This gave birth to the "new rhetoric". It too, like topics, starts from the 
Aristotelian idea o f endoxa, that is, the thesis that the premises of
the notion of "prejudice": see GADAMER, Wahrhcit und Methode. Grundziige ciner 
philosophischcn Hermeneulik, 6th ed., Tubingen 1990, pp. 281 ff.; on this see 
Jurgen Habermas's critical observations in the third chapter o f his Zur Logik der 
Sozia Ì wisxen sch a hen (see J. HABERMAS, Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften, 5lh 
enlarged ed., Frankfurt am Main 1982, pp. 271 ff.).




























































































practical discourse can be founded on ly on probable or likely 
statements, or ones accepted by general opinion.
In Perelman too, as in Viehweg, it is discussion as such that is the 
founding element o f practical argumentation. Perelman's theory is, 
however, more articulated than Viehweg's. In particular, it escapes the 
latter's typical defect o f being insufficiently analytic in reconstructing 
arguments.
Perelman starts from a close critique o f the dominant doctrine in 
both philosophical and legal spheres, which tends to equate theoretical 
reason and practical reason, that is, to deny the independence o f the 
latter and reduce it to the former. His explicitly polemical objective is 
the "conception of reason and o f reasoning born with Descartes, which 
has marked the last three centuries o f Western philosophy"17, and 
conceives reasoning as a binding discursive procedure.
Perelman's Leitmotiv is that formal logic is incapable o f yielding 
fruit in practical reason, and that nonetheless there is a practical 
reasoning distinct from the theoretical discourse o f the scientist. It is a 
discourse equipped with its own internal rationality criteria, in no way 
condemned to decisionism or reduced to a mere beating o f fists on 
tables, as authoritative representatives o f logical neopositivism and of 
analytical philosophy try to make out, in the sphere o f legal theory too 
(e.g., A lf Ross18).
Perelman's basic concept is that o f the audience. The audience 
is the set o f subjects that the speaker wishes to influence by his 
argumentation. The object o f argumentation is to secure audience 
support for the speaker's theses. Accordingly, rhetoric "has as its object 
the study o f discursive techniques likely to promote or enhance the 
acceptance by minds of theses offered for their assent"19.
The audience is accordingly decisive in characterizing an 
argument. "The notion o f audience is central in rhetoric. For a discourse 
cannot be effective unless it is adapted to the audience that is to be 
persuaded or convinced20. An argument may be convincing or not,
17 CH. PERELMAN, L  OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, La novelle rhétorique. Traité tie 
l'argumentation, Vol. 1, Paris 1958, p. 1.
18 See A. ROSS, On Law and Justice, London 1958, p. 274.
19 CH. PERELMAN, Logique Juridique. Nouvelle rhétorique, Paris 1976, p. 105. 
See L  GIANFORMAGGIO, La nuova retorica di Perelman, in Discorso e retorica, ed. 
by C. Pontecorvo, Torino 1981, pp. 110 ff.




























































































depending on the audience it is addressed to. This, according to 
Perelman, implies that the fundamental rule o f argumentation is 
suitability o f the discourse to the audience, whatever that be.
Put this way, it would seem that Perelman's theory is nothing 
but a strategic theory o f argumentation aimed at securing consensus 
irrespective o f the quality o f the thesis under discussion and o f the 
arguments employed. But it is not always so. For Perelman, in fact, the 
criterion o f the rationality and objectivity o f all argument lies not in 
support from a specific audience, as expression of a given situation, but 
only in acceptance by the universal audience.
Perelman, however, as Alexy notes21, is ambiguous on the 
composition o f this audience. Initially, in his 1958 Traité de 
l'argumentation, he states that the universality of the audience is only 
that o f a particular community or historical culture and in any case 
depends on the speaker's psychological representations. Subsequently, 
the Belgian scholar seems instead to maintain that the universal 
audience consists o f all rational beings, o f all human beings, or still 
more simply, o f all22.
Equally, while in the 1958 treatise he maintained that it was 
persuasion (o f the audience) that was the criterion o f the rationality of 
argument, in subsequent works he has distinguished clearly between 
persuasion and conviction. Now it would seem to be conviction rather 
than persuasion that is the criterion for argumentative rationality. On 
this last view, not every effective argument (which persuades a certain 
local audience) is also valid (convinces the universal audience). "It will, 
then, be said that appeal is made to reason, using convincing arguments 
that should be accepted by any reasoning being"23. Nonetheless, later on 
Perelman takes care to specify that the audience is defined "instead, as 
the whole set o f those at whom the effort o f persuasion is directed"24. 
One may, thus, address oneself to various audiences. The universal one 
is the audience only for the philosopher; the jurist by contrast has to 
refer to a specific context and a specific social community25.
21 See R. ALEXY, Theorie der jurislischen Argumentation, pp. 203 ff.
22 None can fail to note the closeness of the idea of "universal audience" to 
Peirce's one of a "community without definite limits, capable o f an indefinite 
increment of knowledge" (C. S. PEIRCE, Collected Papers, Vol. 5, p. 311).
23 CH. PERELMAN, op. ult. cit., p. 107.
24 Ibid., p. 122.



























































































Perelman has also denied that the argumentative model he 
sketches out is necessarily monological. The "new rhetoric" he proposes 
would not, then, exclude dialogical argument, and thus the exchange of 
roles between speaker and audience, and a conception o f impartiality 
and formal justice no longer based solely on the generality or 
universality o f the speaker's statements, but also on the possibility for 
the audience to require reasons o f the speaker, and hence to change 
from mere passive recipient o f the message into active participant in a 
discourse26.
II. 2. Viehweg's and Perelman's pioneering work has more recently 
been followed by reconstructions or proposals fo r models o f legal 
reasoning. The latter are, by comparison with these first two attempts, 
marked by greater trust in the resources o f formal logic, or else less 
suspicion o f theoretical reason. While in Perelman and in Viehweg one 
sometimes notes a certain antirationalist pathos27, this is no longer the 
case for the major contemporary theories o f legal reasoning, both 
MacCormick's and Alexy's and Ronald Dworkin's; the first two being 
undoubtedly more formalist, the last more "communitarian", or i f  you 
wish antiformalist.
Behind the syllogistic model o f legal reasoning there is in general, 
maintains MacCormick, the "validity thesis". The Scots scholar puts this 
as follows: "Legal systems have criteria, sustained by 'acceptance' in the 
society, satisfaction o f which is at least presumptively sufficient for the 
existence o f a rule as a 'valid system' o f the system"28. These criteria in 
essence correspond to what H. L. A. Hart calls "recognition norms", 
norms that supply us with criteria whereby we "recognize" the other 
norms as forming part o f a particular legal order and hence as valid. 
Yet the "recognition norm" too has to be "recognized", in a different 
sense from the one in which the other norms may be said to be
26 See CH. PERELMAN, Cinq leçons sur la justice, in idem, Droit, morale et 
philosophie, Paris 1968, p. 54.
27 For instance when Viehweg rules out the possibility o f topics having 
anything to do with the syllogistic model, or in general with deductions o f a 
formal-logical nature: "Die Topik ist eine von der Rhetorik entwickelle Techne des 
Problemdenkens. Sie entfaltet ein geistiges Gefiige, das sich bis in Einzelheiten 
hinein eindeutig von einem deduktiv-systematischen unterscheidet" (TH. 
VIEHWEG, Topik und Jurisprudenz, V ed., cit. p. 14).




























































































recognized as valid: it must namely, to be "recognized" as such, first and 
foremost be effective, de facto observed and applied. Yet this is 
sufficient only from a purely external viewpoint, say that o f an 
ethnologist studying the norms o f a particular community and seeking 
to offer a survey o f them. From the internal viewpoint, o f someone 
operating within the legal system for which a particular norm is the 
"recognition norm", the ascertainment or "recognition" o f its being 
"recognized", viz. practised and observed as "recognition norm", is not 
enough. Since this norm has to justify other norms and ultimately 
practices, it has to possess such a normative character as to justify 
ought statements: that is, it must be legitimate.
To be such, the "recognition norm", continues MacCormick, has to 
be screened against reasons like: (i) it is good for legal decisions to be 
predictable and hence to adopt objectively or intersubjectively 
recognizable criteria (hence the "recognition norm"); (ii) it is good for 
judges to confine themselves to applying the law and not producing it 
(making law), so as through separation o f powers to secure greater 
guarantees o f public and private liberties. And the presence of a 
recognition norm as a public criterion enables the law and its 
application to be distinguished. For were the law not objectively 
recognizable, depending accordingly on the mere interpretation of 
whoever is applying it29, the distinction between the norm and its 
application would dissolve, and with it that between legislation 
(production o f norms) and jurisdiction (application o f norms). (Not to 
mention, one might add, the very reason for the existence of the norms: 
what use could a norm ever be if  its meaning were reduced in 
everything and for everything to the mere act o f application?). Only if 
the norms (and their meanings) pre-exist application can application be 
separated from the production o f the norms themselves and be 
checkable by reference to them, so that the norms can maintain their 
function (their main one, if not the only one) o f guiding human conduct. 
A further reason to screen the "recognition norm" against would then 
be the following: (hi) the constitutional order of which the "recognition 
norm" is the expression is a just order and therefore to be complied 
with (along with the norm in question).
29 A position brilliantly defended in Italy by Giovanni Tarello. See G. TARELLO, 
11 "problema dell'interpretazione": una formulazione ambigua, in idem, Diritto, 




























































































Deductive justification (on the basis of a particular norm taken as 
"valid") thus comes about within the framework of the legitimacy o f a 
particular institutional order. This, for MacCormick, is a first 
fundamental limit o f the syllogistic model: that for better or worse it 
has to start from some sort o f assumption o f a political and normative 
nature. That is always there in any legal order and in whatever political 
system.
But in his view there are two other limits present especially in 
hard cases. The first is that o f "interpretation", the second that of 
"relevance". The norms are expressed through linguistic statements, 
that is, in order to be communicated and apprehended, they have to be 
formulated in linguistic expressions. But language is often vague and 
ambiguous: accordingly, to derive meaning from it it has to be 
"interpreted". But by syllogism alone, which is nothing but the 
deduction o f a conclusion from a major premise combined with a minor 
premise, one cannot, where normative syllogisms are concerned (that is 
those deriving from a norm as the major premise),30 either produce or 
interpret norms (the major premises). It is to the production o f norms 
that the "validity thesis” is directed, with the associated reference to 
the legitimacy of the recognition norm. To interpret the norm, assuming 
that the language is in any case "open-textured", one must have 
recourse to hermeneutic criteria outside the deductive justificatory 
model. Assuming that the logical structure o f a norm can be reduced to 
the pattern "if p then q", and that the problem o f interpretation means 
answering the question "what does p mean: p' or p" or even p ’"?", the 
problem o f "relevance" is to know whether the norm "if p then q" 
applies, that is, is relevant, to the state o f affairs under consideration. 
In this case, MacCormick goes on, one may ask the question: "Does the 
law in any way justify a decision in favour o f this party against that 
party in this context?"31.
30 There are also those who deny the possibility of the normative syllogism, 
excluding the applicability of logic to norms. This, as we know, is the case for the 
"later" Kelsen (see H. KELSEN, Allgemeine Theorie der Normen, Wien 1978). On this 
view one is therefore constrained to deny the very possibility o f legal argument, 
and hence to uphold radically irrationalistic, decisionistic theses. Behind judicial 
decision there are, on this view, not reasons but motives, sociological, 
psychological or even physiological causes (say indigestion), unreflexively 
determining the judge's conduct.




























































































In the hard cases produced by problems o f interpretation and 
relevance, a first guiding criterion is that o f formal justice, according to 
which like cases must be treated alike, and hence the decision o f a case 
oriented on a general, or universal, or universalizable, criterion. "Any 
justification o f a decision in such areas o f dispute must involve the 
making o f a 'ruling' which is (in the strict logical sense) 'universal', or 
'generic', even though the parties' own dispute and its facts are 
irreducibly individual and particular, as must be the order or orders 
issued to them in termination of the dispute1'32. But these "rulings", 
these general or universal rules, whereby the decision o f the hard case 
is justified, must in turn be justified. We then move on to what the 
Scots scholarcalls "second-order justification". "Second-order 
justification must therefore involve justifying choices; choices between 
rival possible rulings. And these are choices to be made within the 
specific context o f a functioning legal system; that context imposes 
some obvious constraints on the process"33.
The guiding criteria  fo r this sort o f "second-order 
justification" are basically: (i) "making sense of the perceptible world" 
and (ii) "making sense within the given legal system"34, that is, the legal 
principles must at this level be compatible with knowledge o f the 
structures o f the empirical world, and be consistent with the set of 
principles, norms and values that constitute that particular legal order. 
In particular, "making sense o f the world" refers to the consequences 
that the rules have on reality. The rules active at the "second level” 
must accordingly be assessed for their consequences.
As far as "making sense within the legal system" goes, this 
means that the criteria identified must (i) be logically compatible (or 
not contradictory) with the system's valid norms and (ii) be "consistent" 
or "congruent" with the general principles and values o f the legal 
system under consideration. "Consistency" or "congruency", "coherence", 
means that the manifold rules o f a legal system must "make sense" if 
considered as a whole35. This is possible as far as certain specific sets of 
norms are concerned thanks to rules of a still more general nature (the
32 Ibid., p. 100.
33 Ibid., p. 101.
34 Ibid., p. 103.
35 See also N. MACCORMICK, La congruenza nella giustificazione giuridica, in 
N. MACCORMICK, O. WEINBERGER, Il diritto come istituzione, ed. by M. La Torre, 




























































































"principles"), o f which the norms in question can be regarded as 
representing an emanation. A princip le is accord ingly  the 
rationalization of a specific norm. The principles then play a twofold 
role: justification and explanation. "Justification" is when a norm can be 
subsumed under a principle P, assessed as such as positive or good, so 
that norm N can consequently likewise can be assessed as positive or 
good. "Explanation" is when there is doubt as to the intrinsic meaning of 
norm N, and its being subsumed under principle P supplies the key to 
understanding the meaning o f the norm; one application o f this mode of 
procedure is analogy, a very common procedure in legal reasoning.
Neil MacCormick, in short, reconstructs the theory o f legal 
reasoning on the basis o f the idea of formal justice. Anyone raising a 
legal claim in relation to certain circumstances, says MacCormick, and 
asserting that this claim is legitimate, also implicitly asserts the position 
that that particular claim is legitimate in any other circumstance 
similar to the one giving rise to the claim.
The principle o f formal justice, that what is equal (in every 
essential aspect) should be treated equally, is for the Scots scholar the 
Grundprinzip, the fundamental principle, o f legal reasoning. He sees this 
principle as acting in two directions. In one direction, it is assumed by 
anyone raising a legal claim, claiming a certain right, for instance; in the 
other, the principle o f formal justice is seen as leading, in legal 
reasoning, to a principle o f still more general scope: the principle of 
universalizability.
A legal decision will be correct, on this view, only i f  it is 
capable o f being universalized, that is, can be applied consistently in 
the future too to similar cases. In this sense every legal decision, even 
when it has to do with questions o f fact, turns round a point o f law. The 
criterion o f "coherence" obviously does not rule out the possibility o f 
deductive justification o f legal decision. MacCormick accordingly does 
not question what was earlier called the "syllogistic model". He merely 
seeks to integrate it, complete it and refine it.
It should further be specified that a decision's capability of 
being universalizable here represents only a necessary, but not also 
sufficient, condition for its correctness. In addition to the principle of 
universalizability, recourse has to be had to consequentialist 
considerations about the acceptability o f the decision itself, that is, its 
practical consequences for the parties. For MacCormick, however, 




























































































acceptable only to the parties in question but not for all others who 
might be in the same position, that is, a decision acceptable to the 
parties in question but inconsistent with the legal order, would, for the 
Scots scholar, have to be rejected36.
II. 3. Ronald Dworkin identifies three chief conceptions o f law. 
The first two are those he calls "conventionalism" and "pragmatism". 
Conventionalism is roughly the equivalent of what Raz calls "source 
theory"37. The fundamental idea here is that there are social 
conventions that once and for all determine what the law is, and the 
judge thus m erely has to "find" these. Nonetheless, Dworkin's 
"conventionalist" recognizes that his conventions are not complete, so 
that in certain "hard cases" the judge cannot have recourse to any 
"source" in deciding, and has to base himself on a discretionary choice38. 
"Conventionalism" is, then, a decisionist variant o f "source theory”, 
fa irly faithfully reproducing the image o f the "reform ed" legal 
positivism proposed by Hans Kelsen and H. L. A. Hart. For both, the 
judge is no mere applier o f norms, but has considerable powers to 
produce norms.
Pragmatism is instead an instrumentalist conception o f law, 
seen solely as an instrument towards certain ends, over and above any 
faithfulness to texts, forms or procedures. What counts here is a certain 
"policy", an objective to be reached, in relation to which the legal means 
proves particularly appropriate, and to which, so to speak, it can be 
bent. Whereas conventionalism looks back to decisions taken in the 
past, intending in general to reproduce them, pragmatism does not 
have these concerns for historical continuity, and instead looks forward 
to the objects to be achieved. Using some old terminology o f Niklas 
Luhmann's, we might say that "conventionalism" represents or is 
moved by a "conditional programme", that is, lays down the conditions 
for certain conduct, and that "pragmatism" is a "purposive programme",
36 MacCormick's is, then, not so much a "consequentialism of the act" as a 
"consequentialism of the rule": see N. MACCORMICK, On Legal Decisions and their 
Consequences : From Dewey to Dworkin, in "New York University Law Review", 
1983, pp. 240 ff.
37 For a similar use o f the term "conventionalism", see L  STRAUSS, On Natural 
Law, now in idem, Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy, ed. by T. Pangl, 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1983.




























































































sets the objectives to be pursued by legal activity irrespective of 
constitutive or regulatory conditions. To explain the difference between 
pragmatism and conventionalism, Dworkin uses the figure o f subjective 
right. While for conventionalism, which is a non-sceptical theory, there 
are rights that the subject can claim by referring to legal texts and 
judicial precedents, "pragmatism, on the contrary, denies that people 
ever have legal rights; it takes the bracing view that they are never 
entitled to what would otherwise be worse for the community just 
because some legislature said so or a long string o f judges decided" ” . 
According to the "pragmatist", norms and rights are merely, so to speak, 
the servants o f a better future; as such, they have no strength or value 
o f their own.
To these two conceptions, regarded as unsatisfactory 
particularly because they do not take norms and rights sufficiently 
seriously, and trust to judicial decisionism, Dworkin counterposes the 
conception o f law as "integrity"". This asserts that the law is basically 
an interpretive practice guided by the fundamental principles o f a 
certain community, aimed at supplying the "best possible theory" o f 
these. This "integrity", note, is not the tradition o f a particular legal 
order, but its strong normative content (political and moral): it is a 
synchronic rather than diachronic principle. "It insists that the law 
contains not only the narrow explicit content of these decisions but also, 
more broadly, the scheme o f principles necessary to justify them"®.
Now this "integrity” has a specific content, given by three 
principles, namely "fairness”, "justice" and "due process o f law"39 401. 
"Fairness" is the procedure that enables political power to be 
distributed in the justest possible way. "Justice" has instead to do not so 
much with procedures as with the outcomes o f political decisions. It is 
mainly a criterion for redistributing goods and rights. "Due process" is a 
procedure for assessing when a subject has breached the laws laid 
down by the political decisions42.
Once the concept o f law as "integrity" is accepted, Dworkin 
derives three consequences, namely (a) that the law is an interpretive 
(reconstructive) practice, (b) that this practice is guided by principles, 
and (c) that it therefore aims -  as normative, "principled" practice — at
39 Ibid., p. 152.
40 Ibid., p. 227.
41 See ibid., p. 243.




























































































the "one right answer", i.e. the justification for its choices, and 
accordingly at the assertion that its choices are "justified". Dworkin 
further derives from the concept o f "integrity" a number of interpretive 
criteria that should guide the judge's action. The first, basic one is fairly 
obviously that o f the "best possible theory" implicit in the normative 
point of view. The American scholar also preliminarily identifies three 
stages in any interpretive practice, (i) A first pre-interpretative phase 
in which the rules and criteria to refer to for identifying a particular 
practice are identified, (ii) Second, a stage o f interpretation in the strict 
sense, presenting the reasons why a particular practice is considered in 
a particular way, or particular meanings are ascribed to it. (iii) Third, a 
post-interpretative stage, in which the practice interpreted is 
reconsidered in the light o f the reasons established at the interpretive 
stage. Interpretation thus amounts to a sort o f "reformation", however 
minimum and imperceptible, o f the object interpreted43. The theory of 
interpretation then becomes eminently a theory o f argumentation.
If one starts from a conception of law as "integrity", the central 
aspect o f the judge's activity is interpretation. At this level, two further 
stages o f the judge's argumentative operations must be distinguished: 
"fit" and "justification". The criterion o f "fit" allows us to make a first 
selection among the available interpretations: only those should be 
accepted that take account of, or are consistent with, the "fit", the set of 
norms, principles and values that make up that particular order. 
However, since the meshes o f this first sieve are still rather broad, it is 
likely that more than one interpretation among those available will 
pass the test o f "fit". There then has to be a further selection: 
"justification"44. Justification differs according to the relevant judicial 
sphere and according to the legal system concerned. It will thus be 
different according to whether one has to do with "common law" or 
with interpreting statutes. In the latter case -- which is what interests 
us "continental lawyers" — the criteria o f justification identified by 
Dworkin number three: "fairness", "textual integrity”, "legislative 
history"45. "Fairness" can be understood here as a sort o f criterion of 
"reasonableness" or "constitutionality"; "textual integrity" corresponds 
to our grammatical and systematic interpretation; and "legislative 
history" represents the criterion o f recourse to the legislator's will.
43 See ibid., pp. 65-67.
44 See ibid., pp. 255-256.




























































































The requirement o f legal certainty is, as we see, by no means 
ignored by Dworkin, whatever many o f his critics may say. It might 
even be maintained that he is obsessed by it, to the point o f supplying 
a veritable catalogue o f rules o f legal argumentation. And this is 
confirmed by the interest that constitutes the guiding theme o f all his 
work: rejection o f the idea o f the judge's verdict as a discretionary 
decision.
From the viewpoint o f legal theory, for Dworkin the central 
question in relation to a judge's decisions is not whether they are 
"judicial", i.e., decisions by a judge exercising his functions, but whether 
these decisions are right. Just as, one m ight add, from the 
epistemological viewpoint the central question regarding linguistic 
statements about a particular state o f affairs is not whether they are 
"linguistic", but whether they are true. This obviously takes no 
relevance away from  the prelim inary question o f identifying a 
particular event as a judge's decision (or a linguistic statement), for the 
solution of which the criteria identified by an empiricist, legal-positivist 
methodology (in particular, recourse to a "norm o f recognition") may 
prove very useful"6.
Accordingly, retorting, to those asserting that legal decisions 
constitute a special case o f practical decision, that legal decisions are 
"judicial" and hence different from other types o f practical decision 
(especially the moral kind) and that the decisions o f judge Hercules (the 
ideal judge in Dworkin's picture) are just as "legal" as those o f the 
lowest magistrate46 7 amounts to upholding a thesis that the theorist of 
the "special case" in no way intends to dispute. Legal decisions cannot, 
in the latter's view, be reduced to specifically moral decisions, since 
they too constitute a special kind, though a different one, o f practical 
decision. On the other hand, what is at stake here (in attributing to 
judicial decisions the quality o f being a "special case" o f practical
46 It is only this function, the methodological or gnoseological one, that a non­
ideologizing legal positivism is left with (that is, one that does not assert that the 
law always deserves obedience as such, and does not simply identify State and law). 
On legal positivism as "theory", "ideology" or "methodology", I refer to the classic 
contribution by N. BOBBIO, Giusnaturalismo e positivismo giuridico, Milan 1965, pp. 
101 ff.
47 Cf. e.g., F. J. LAPORTA, Etica y  derecho en el pensamiento contemporaneo, in 





























































































decision) is not the descriptive qualification of an event (the decision in 
question) and hence its "legality", but the normative description o f that 
event (the "rightness" o f a decision), as the only thing that can justify a 
normative conclusion (the provision in the judicial verdict).
The theory o f argument and interpretation developed by 
Ronald Dworkin might at first sight seem very  far away from 
MacCormick's theory. While MacCormick is a legal positivist and 
(moderately) non-cognitivist, Dworkin appears in the opinion o f many 
as the renewer o f a sort o f more-or-less sociologizing natural-law 
approach. While Dworkin defends the idea o f the "one right answer", 
MacCormick does not abandon Hart's thesis o f the discretionariness of 
judicial decision4*, fiercely disputed by the American scholar44.
Properly considered, though, Dworkin and MacCormick are 
much closer than might seem. For Dworkin -  as we have just said — 
there are three main guiding criteria for the rightness and fairness of 
the legal decision.
(i)First, it must be aimed at placing a certain norm in the "best 
light" possible. If a norm is applied, it is applied, from the viewpoint of 
the one applying it, in the best possible way. In the same way, i f  a play 
is put on, it is interpreted from the actor's viewpoint according to what 
is the best probable interpretation possible. Just as it would be 
pragmatically contradictory to play a Mozart piece deliberately badly, 
in the same way it is, for Dworkin, contradictory to apply a legal 
provision in accordance with a meaning that is not the best possible.
(ii) The judge must further follow two other criteria, integrity and 
fit (or "consistency"). The criterion o f fit is that a judge has the 
obligation, as he puts it, to interpret the legal story as it comes to him 
already told, not to invent a different story, even if a better one. The 
decision must thus be consistent with the legal order enforced; it must, 
so to speak, constitute another link in an already existing narrative 
chain, and therefore extend that chain in a direction that suits ("fits") 
the one already taken by the story, that is, the series o f verdicts and 
legal decisions handed down.
(iii) But the decision must also aim at the criterion o f integrity. This 
is not so much the historical consistency o f the legal order, but 
represents the decision's content of formal justice. A decision meets the 489
48 Cf. H. L  A. HART, The Concept o f Law, Oxford 1961, pp. 121 IT., 138 ft.
49 Read R. DWORKIN, Taking Rights Seriously, 2nd ed., 6th reprinting, London 




























































































criterion o f integrity if it meets the principle of treating like cases alike. 
Integrity in short amounts to universalizability50. But fit as coherence 
and integrity as universalizability are the criteria on which, as we have 
seen, MacCormick too builds up his proposals.
Moreover, the thesis o f the one right answer does not for Dworkin, 
at least the later Dworkin, mean that for every case there is already 
one single possible right decision. It means instead that for whoever is 
taking a legal decision, it represents the one right answer for the case 
in question51. But this position is fairly similar to MacCormick's other
50 In this connection note what Klaus Gunther has written: "Das Prinzip der 
integrity muft jedoch nichl zwangslaufig am gegebenen Kontext einer politischen 
Moral seine Grenze finden. Das Recht auf equal respect and concern, als dessen 
Verkorperung Dworkin integrity einfiihrt, weist namlich einen universalistichen 
C.ehalt auf" (K. GUNTHER, Der Sinn fu r Angemessenheit. Anwendungsdiskurse in 
Moral und Recht, Frankfurt am Main 1988, p. 351).
51 Those who take the normative viewpoint, asserting the validity of a 
particular statement, whether "thoreretical" or "practical", ipso facto imply that, 
rebus sic stantibus, that is, given the state of available knowledge, it is the best 
possible, and therefore represents the "one right answer". (Subject, obviously, to 
revisions due to increases in knowledge relevant to the case under consideration, 
and to the assessment o f arguments thitherto unknown to anyone, nor adopted by 
anyone). This is proved very well and emphatically by Immanuel Kant, in 
extending the normative viewpoint to the whole of philosophy: "Wenn also jemand 
ein System der Philosophic als sein eigenes Fabrikat ankiindigt, so ist es eben so 
viel, als ob er sagte: 'vor dieser Philosophie sei gar keine andere noch gewesen'. 
Denn wollte er einraumen, es ware eine andere (und wahre) gewesen, so wiirde es 
iiber dieselben Gegenstande zweierlei wahre Philosohphie gegeben haben, 
welches sich widerspricht" (1. KANT, Metaphysiche Anfangsgriinde der 
Rechtslehrc, Metaphysik der Sitten, Erster Teil, ed. by B. Ludwig, cit., p. 7). 
Accordingly the target is missed by all those criticisms that either take the "one 
right answer" thesis as a sociologizing descriptive hypothesis (meaning that this 
right solution actually exists), or else reduce the idea to a "regulatory ideal", in the 
sense of one o f the various possible "ideologies of judges" (for this attitude towards 
the American scholar's work, cf. e.g. L. PRIETO SANCHIS, Cuatro preguntas a 
proposito de Dworkin, in "Revista de ciencias sociales", Universidad de Valparaiso 
(Chile), Vol. 38 (1993), pp. 69 ff.). Nor should it be forgotten that the thesis of the 
"one right answer" as regulatory ideal is, as Habermas shows, the basis of the 
legitimacy of the democratic political order: "Die deliberative Politik wiirde ihren 




























































































idea that any legal decision turns round a point o f law, and therefore as 
such has an intrinsic claim to rightness.
II. 4. 1 come finally to Robert Alexy's theory o f legal reasoning.
He develops in the legal sphere ideas o f Jurgen Habermas's. Alexy, like 
Habermas, starts from the assumption that ideas and concepts have a 
discursive origin. One speaks, or thinks too, only because one is in and 
has been incorporated into a context of discourses from which our 
socialization takes its origin. But this transcends individual cultures. 
The discursive practice Habermas and Alexy refer to is universal, that 
is, independent o f local contexts.
These two authors then hold that they can identify a series of 
transcendental principles, that is, ones implicitly assumed by any 
participant in a discourse, and even by any speaker. Anyone uttering a 
statement, or performing a speech act, is ipso facto said to put forward 
the claim, or to assert, that (i) his linguistic utterance is sincere (that is, 
fits what the speaker really thinks), (ii) is correct or "happy" (fits the 
social norms governing that act and is appropriate to the specific 
situation it is uttered in), and finally (iii) is true or valid (that is, 
universally acceptable to subjects affected or "interested" by the 
statement itself)” . All o f these claims can come about and be met only 52
verlieren, wenn wir als Teilnehmer an politische Diskussionen nicht andere 
iiberzeugcn und von anderen lemen konnen. Der politische Streit wiirde seinen 
deliberativen Charakter einbuRen und zum ausschlieRlich strategischen 
Machtkampf degencrieren, wenn die beteiligten nicht auch - gewiR in dem 
fallibilistischen BewuRtsein, sich jederzeit irren zu konnen - davon ausgehen 
wiirdcn, das die strittigen politischen und rechtlichen Probleme eine 'richtige' 
Losung finden kOnnten. Ohne die Orientierung am Zeil eincr durch Griinde 
auszuweisenden ProblemlOsung wiiRten die Teilnehmer gahr nicht, wonach sie 
suchen sollten" (J. HABERMAS, Replik auf Bcilrage zu einem Symposion der 
Cardozo Law School, now in idem, Die Einbeziehung des Anderen. Schriften zur 
politischen Theorie, Frankfurt am Main 1996, pp. 325-326).
52 For an anticipation of this thesis cf. TH. V1EHWEG, Topik und Jurisprudenz, V 
ed.,cit., p. 118: "Wer sich auf eine Redesituation einlaRt, ubernimmt Pflichten, die 
wiederum dem Verstandnis des praktizierenden Juristen sehr naheliegen", and in 
Italian legal-philosophical culture E. D1 ROBILANT, Sui princip i di giustizia, 
Milano 1961: "That a criterion is capable o f being 'founded' means _ that 
arguments can be adduced in its justification; but these are aimed at proving to 




























































































in discursive situations. These implicit claims then become still stronger 
in the case o f judicial decisions, where the claim to rightness takes on 
the features o f a veritable claim to justice. For it would be 
inconceivable, and hence performatively contradictory for the judge to 
add to his verdict, after reading the measure, "and this is unjust".
Alexy counterposes his proposal to four alternative models: (a) 
the decision model, (b) the deductive one, (c) the hermeneutic one and 
(d) coherence. The first maintains that in reality there is no discourse 
or argumentation that is valid in law, and indeed that judicial 
experience sanctions an opposite situation from that o f discussion. This 
is a radical decisionist model, the paradigmatic representative o f which 
might be regarded as one brand of American legal realism* 53.
The second model is the one we earlier called the "syllogistic 
model", on which I do not feel it necessary to add anything else. The 
third is the one proposed by Gadamer and Betti: Alexy recognizes its 
importance, but regards it as too self-satisfied. All the hermeneutic 
problems, in particular those raised by the so-called hermeneutic circle 
in its various parts, can in his view be solved using adequate principles 
o f argumentative rationality. The theory o f interpretation must 
accordingly, for A lexy, inevitably come down to a theory o f 
argumentation.
The fourth model criticized by A lexy is the one known as 
"coherence", coherence with the normative order. An order, says the
Adducing arguments to justify a criterion, that is, implies the at least implicit 
claim to its universal validity".
53 Oliver Wendell Holmes's: he stresses that "judges are called on to exercise the 
sovereign prerogative o f choice" (see O. W. HOLMES, The Theory o f  Legal 
Interpretation, hi idem, Collected Papers, New York 1952, p. 203), or else Jerome 
Frank's: he condemns the principle of "certainty of law" to the role of a rhetorical 
ornament on the permanent irrationality of legal decision, the real motivations of 
which are sometimes instead to be sought even in the more-or-less troubled 
digestive processes of the judging subject (cf. J. FRANK, Law and the Modern Mind, 
6th reprint, New York 1963, chapter 12). However, Jerome Frank's dccisionism is 
attenuated by the consideration that decision is an event that escapes the subject's 
free disposal, and is instead largely determined by processes over which human 
will has very little grip. In this connection see the critical considerations by N. 
BOBBIO, La certezza del diritto e un mito?, in "Rivista internazionale di filosofia del 
diritto", Vol. 29 (1952), pp. 146 ff., and B. ACKERMAN, Law and the Modern Mind by 




























































































German scholar, is never complete. Accordingly, coherence alone cannot 
be enough. A model o f legal reasoning centred on coherence must 
necessarily prove insufficient.
Alexy's alternative is a procedural model. Discourse, any discourse, 
presupposes principles for conducting discourse itself. (This is 
significantly adumbrated in Viehweg's own topics, at first sight the 
expression o f a "realist", anti-rationalist and anti-normativist 
Weltanschauung. For Viehweg writes: "When anyone speaks, he has to 
be able to justify his discourse’’54). The point is, then, for Alexy, to make 
explicit what is implicit, and universalize it. Universalization is in turn a 
transcendental (implicit) requirement o f discourse on norms, values 
and principles.
Asserting that something (a piece o f behaviour) is just, or that A is 
a valid norm, implies a claim to the validity or rightness o f the 
statement, and hence the anti-sceptical thesis that there is a "right 
answer”. (This is put similarly by Dworkin: "So there is no important 
difference in philosophical category or standing between the statement 
that slavery is wrong and the statement that there is a right answer to 
the question o f slavery, namely that it is wrong. I cannot intelligibly 
hold the first opinion as a moral opinion without also holding the 
second"55). The idea o f the validity claim, continues Alexy, in turn 
contains the idea of being universally valid for all cases like the one in 
question. However, in order for this claim to validity and universality 
to be legitimate, it must satisfy the principles that can be derived from 
the normative -- procedural — nature o f our practical discourses.
The rules of practical discourse for Alexy have two principal types: 
(a) rules on the structures of arguments (for instance, the consistent 
use o f predicates, or linguistic clarity), or else (b ) rules on the 
procedures employed for the discourse (for instance, the rule that any 
speaker can take part in a discourse). For the German scholar, practical 
discourse is distinguished from legal discourse because the latter is tied 
to certain substantive limitations: for instance, legal discourse by 
contrast with practical discourse cannot go on endlessly but instead has 
specific time-limits. Nonetheless, with a few adjustments and additions,
54 TH. VIKHWEG, Topik unci Jurisprudenz, V ed. cit., p. 119.




























































































legal discourse according to Alexy represents a special case of practical 
discourse5".
I I I .
I now come to the concluding section o f these brief considerations, 
on the impact or influence o f theories o f legal reasoning on specific 
questions o f legal philosophy. A first influence is methodological in 
nature. Theories o f reasoning and argumentation help to make legal 
philosophy itself more argumentative, to enrich its dialectic and make 
it an object o f apposite reflection. Legal theory thus becomes the silent 
prologue to any legal dispute.
But I see further influences on two o f the most classical themes in 
the philosophical study of law. (i) The first is the very concept o f law. 
The theories o f legal reasoning, by highlighting determining aspects of 
legal decision that are external to the law, call in crisis the formalist, 
legal positive (statist) concept o f law. They open up a broader, more 
liberal, more pluralist notion o f legal experience. One can now calmly 
assert, as Guido Calabresi does, that convictions, ideals and modes of 
thought are an integral part o f our law56 7 58. What is asserted is what 
Robert Alexy calls a "three-level model", a "Regel/Prinzipien/Prozedur 
Model',S8, an image o f law no longer obsessively dominated by the idea 
o f the rule, o f the norm, with a central role instead assigned to
56 See R. ALEXY, Thcorie der juristischcn Argumentation, pp. 263 ff. Note that 
this is also the opinion of Neil MacCormick (see N. MACCORMICK, Legal Theory and 
Legal Reasoning, cit., pp. 263 ff.) and of Jurgen Habermas (see J. HABERMAS, 
Replik auf Beitragc zu eincm Symposion der Cardozo Law School, cit., pp. ?), who 
has however declared his opposition to the thesis of the special case (see J. 
HABERMAS, Faklizilal und Gellung. Beitragc zur Diskurstheoric des Rechts und dcs 
demokralischen Rechtsstaals, Erankfurt am Main 1992, pp. 283 ff.), to that extern 
accepting the theses o f Klaus Gunther (see K. GUNTHER, Der Sinn fur 
Angcmessenheit, cit., pp. 309 ff., and especially K. GUNTHER, Critical Remarks on 
Robert Alexy's "Special Case Thesis", in "Ratio Juris", 1993, pp. 143 ff., in relation to 
which read Alexy's prompt reply, Justification and Application o f  Norms, in "Ratio 
Juris", 1993, pp. 157 ff.).
s: Sec the "conclusion" of G. CALABRESI, Ideals, Beliefs, Attitudes, and the Law. 
Private law Perspectives on a Public Law Problem, Syracuse, N. Y. 1985.
58 See e.g. R. ALEXY, Rcchtssystem und praktischc Vernunfl, now in idem, 





























































































principles, which Alexy defines as "optimization precepts" o f the values 
they express59.
(ii) These theories, then, since they hold that decision is the 
outcome of non-legal (not located in texts o f law) criteria o f rightness, 
instead justified by more general or stronger normative praxes (like 
Alexy’s and Habermas's ideal discourse), end up referring to vaguely 
moral criteria. This goes some way to filling up the gap between law 
and morality dug by modern legal positivism. In particular, on a 
prospect that favours the discursive or communicative element over 
the decisional or instrumental one, the very concept o f law loses much 
of its more truculent features as a coercive order. Violence is shaded 
out o f the picture o f the essential features o f the phenomenon o f law, 
and the more human features o f rights clearly asserted. It is then not 
so much the monopoly o f violence as its domestication that is imposed 
through the form of the State.
Theories o f legal reasoning further contribute to changing our 
perception o f the State based on rule of law. This is no longer the State 
where judges and administration are subject only to law, but also and 
especially one where jurisdiction and administration are governed by 
procedures able to satisfy exacting principles o f argumentative 
correctness. Once the law is conceived of as argumentative practice, the 
rule o f law will be the political form that best reflects, or gives most 
space to, this practice60.
59 See R. ALEXY, Theorie dcr Grundrechte, Frankfurt am Main 1986, pp. 71 ff. It 
is interesting to recall that Habermas, on whom too Alexy’s thought largely draws, 
is obstinately hostile to this reconstruction of the notion o f principle, since he 
feels it opens the door to an economistic instrumentalization o f the institution of 
law and is too generous with the need to coordinate rights (expressed by norms of 
principle), with the consequence of making every fundamental right able to be 
compensated for or derogated from by considerations or another sort (for 
instance, assessments of the public good). See J. HABERMAS, FaktizitSt und Geltung, 
cit., p. 255.
60 Cf. T. CAMPBELL, Legal Studies, in A Companion to Contemporary Political 
Philosophy, ed. R. E. Goodin and Ph. Pettit, 2nd ed., Oxford 1996, p. 184: "The most 
distinctive concern o f legal philosophers is the nature of legal process itself, and 
in particular the analysis and criticism of legal argumentation as it is manifest in 
the selection, interpretation and application o f laws, principally in the setting of 
_court room. This central aspect of legal philosophy has important implications 




























































































Ronald Dworkin explicitly disputes the prevailing conception of 
the rule o f law, in which the "law" in question is understood purely 
formally, so that the State's action is right and just as being conducted 
in respect for the legal forms prescribed by statute, by law in the 
formal sense, that is, by what the American scholar calls the "rule 
book"61. To this conception Dworkin counterposes a "rights-based rule of 
law", one founded on fundamental rights, and hence a substantive 
conception o f the rule o f law. State conduct, in order to meet the 
principles o f the rule o f law, cannot be just formally correct and, like 
Kelsen's Stufenbau, respect the hierarchies o f competences laid down 
by the legal order. A legal order that respects the rule o f law cannot, a 
la Kelsen, be just a "dynamic" order in which the norms are linked to 
each other according to relationships o f Ermachtigung, or empowerment 
delegations. It must instead, if we still wish to fo llow  Kelsen's 
terminology, be a "static" order, in which, that is, the norms are linked 
with each other according to relations o f logical inference, so that the 
State's individual action, the "individual norm", but also the legislator's 
"general norm", can be interpreted as a deduction from the material 
content expressed by fundamental norms o f the system, from its 
principles. Moreover, this is what is practised in States with "rigid" 
constitutions and hence forms o f constitutional justice in which the 
individual norm can be reviewed in relation to the constitution's 
substantive principles and perhaps abrogated should it, though issued 
in conformity with the hierarchy o f State powers, not fit the principles 
o f the constitutional order, or not be deducible from them.
Moreover, a common doctrine in constitutional interpretation 
does not limit principles constitutionally in force to those explicitly 
expressed in the written norms o f the constitutional text. Is it, for 
instance, often asserted that the part o f the constitution devoted to 
fundamental rights, and even the form of government, are not subject 
to constitutional amendment, even though there is no specific norm 
that sets such limits. It is also maintained that the fundamental 
principles stated in the constitution are not necessarily a closed list, but
philosophical presuppositions of the idea of the rule o f law, one of the principal 
ideological foundations of liberal politics and the theory of democracy. For this 
reason competing philosophies of legal argumentation feature centrally in this 
exposition of those aspects of the discipline of law which are o f evident relevance 
to political philosophy".




























































































rather have an exemplary role, showing what the system's highest 
values are". These can then be derived from the constitutional text as a 
whole, from its "sense", and hence from the State's political structure 
and normative ideals o f reference, and thus -- a la Dworkin — from the 
"best theory" o f that particular political community.
Dworkin's "rule o f law" proposal is not, however, only "non- 
formal", substantive, but also "non-negative", i.e. positive* 63. That is, the 
American scholar, having tied the "rule o f law" down to a material 
concept o f justice (as, by the way, Hayek also does64), does not believe 
that the substantive justice in question is purely negative, as, for 
instance, Hayek himself believes, and has more recently been said by 
Joseph Raz65 6; that is, does not believe that is it solely a matter o f 
defending negative freedoms o f individuals. What is rather at stake in 
the idea o f justice evoked here as a basis for the rule o f law is an 
exacting equality requirement, which may on certain occasions entail 
an active attitude by the State in social life.
This attitude finds a counterpart in A lexy's complex, 
articulated theory o f fundamental rights, as being first and foremost 
expressed by principles: that is, the norms that guarantee fundamental 
rights are said to have the nature o f principles. These rights can then 
be balanced against each other and asserted even irrespective o f any 
explicit action by their bearers60. The fundamental rights, being the 
product o f principles, need not necessarily take the form  of 
Abwehrrechte, rights protecting individual freedom  from  undue 
interference by the State, hence establishing a duty o f abstention on
02 This is for instance, Gregorio Peces-Barba's thesis on Article 1 (I) of the 
1978 Spanish Constitution, despite intransigently legal-positive positions 
elsewhere taken by the same author. Cf. G. PECES-BARBA, Los valores superiores, 
Madrid 1986, and G. PECES-BARBA, Los valores superiores, in "Archivo dc filosofia 
del derecho", 1987.
63 Cf. C. L. TEN, Constitutionalism and the Rule o f  Law, in A Companion to 
Contemporary Political Philosophy, ed. by R. E Goodin and Ph. Pettit, London 1996, 
pp. 401-402.
64 His critique of legal positivism and the "constructivism" it is allegedly an 
expression of is certainly not far from similar formulations o f Dworkin's: see F. A. 
HAYEK, The Constitution o f  Liberty, London 1993, pp. 205 ff.
65 See .). RAZ, The Politics o f the Rule o f Law, in "Ratio Juris", 1990, pp. 331 ff.
66 lo r  a similar position cf. J. WALDRON, Rights, in A Companion to 




























































































the State's organs. They may also have as their content positive actions 
o f the State67.
The normative model o f democracy also changes. (This is 
explicit in such authors as Carlos Nino and Jurgen Habermas, who refer 
unambiguously to theories o f practical discourse68). Democracy is no 
longer defined as the system in which popular sovereignty prevails and 
is expressed, but as the institutionalization or, putting it with Dworkin, 
the "best theory" o f the rules o f practical discourse, especially o f its 
three fundamental rules. These are: (1) anyone able to speak can take 
part in the discourse; (2) anyone can question any statement in a 
discourse; (3) no-one can be barred from exercising rights deriving 
from the foregoing rules6".
This seems inter alia to confirm the centrality o f freedom of 
expression among the fundamental rights — despite some recent 
declarations by Roman Herzog, president o f the German Federal 
Republic70, and in line with an intuition o f Nicola Chiaromonte's: 
"Political freedom  is the necessary and natural consequence of 
everyday human speech"71. Political freedom and democracy, that is, 
have a "discursive" hard core that theories o f argumentation as 
normative reconstructions o f practical discourse (such as, notably, 
Robert Alexy's one) serve to highlight.
Similar consequences have been explicitly drawn by Alexy 
himself in a work later than his Theory o f  Legal Argumentation, 
dedicated specifically to the concept o f law: Begriff und Geltung des 
Rechts. Here the German scholar offers us a definition o f the concept of 
law that in a certain sense represents the point o f arrival o f his whole
67 Sec R. ALEXY, Theorie der Grundechle, cit., pp. 395 ff.
68 See J. HABERMAS, Faktizitat und Geltung, and C. S. NINO, Derecho, moral y  
politics, Barcelona 1993, and C. S. NINO, The Constitution o f  Deliberative Democracy, 
New Ilaven, Conn. 1996.
69 See R. ALEXY, Theorie der juristischen Argumentation, pp. 234-235.
70 See R. HERZOG, Die Rechte des Menschen, in "Die Zeit", Sept. 6, 1996. One 
might instead, plausibly, maintain that thinking and communicating are such 
mutually connected activities that any attack on the one would have negative 
repercussions on the other. One may, that is, hold that the very act of thinking has 
an intrinsic communicative component, such that any restriction placed on the 
free expression o f thought impinges on thought, limiting its operationality. .
71 N. CH1AROMONTE, Che cosa rimanc - Taccuini 1955-1971, Bologna 1996, p. 186. 




























































































legal-philosophical thinking: "The law is a normative system, which (1) 
puts forward a claim to rightness, (2) consists of the totality o f norms 
forming part o f a generally socially efficient constitution which are not 
extremely unjust, as well as the totality of norms adopted in conformity 
with that constitution that show a minimum o f efficacy or o f likely 
social efficacy and are not extremely unjust, and (3 ) contains the 
principles and other normative arguments on which is and ought to be 
based the procedure for applying the law in order to meet the claim to 
rightness"72 73.
The theory o f discourse has the further advantage o f being 
able to provide a foundation for democracy and tolerance on a non- 
relativistic meta-ethics. One is democratic and tolerant, on this view, 
not because all opinions are equivalent, a position that condemns 
democracy and tolerance to unjustifiability, and ends up turning 
against itself; we are so instead because discussion, discourse, dialogue, 
require in order to happen the plurality and liberty o f opinions, and 
because discussion, discourse, dialogue, are "objective" the goods, that 
is, are not relative to the subject. One is democratic and tolerant, one 
accepts others' opinions (in the sense o f granting full freedom  o f 
expression to them), because this is required by the procedural rules of 
ideal discourse, and this is an analytical and normative reconstruction 
of the deep structure o f actual discourses, deriving from the "universal 
pragmatics". In short, it is assumed, as one Spanish political thinker o f 
the Baroque period said, that "where there is a dispute ... it is necessary 
that there be defenders o f all opinions [donde se disputa ... es fuerza 
que haya valedores de todas op in ionesf \
The theories o f legal argument have, then, a direct impact on 
our conception o f power and o f politics. They lead us to consider 
political experience as not so much a fight to the death between 
irreconcilable adversaries, a friend-foe ruthless relationship in the 
terms of Carl Schmitt's political realism, or a magnum latrocinium  in the 
sombre tones o f a Dtirer etching, as a public space in which solutions to 
the community's problems are debated and adopted in accordance with 
criteria acceptable to an audience that is tendentially universal. They 
can thus help determine and strengthen that democracy o f rules being 
demanded from several quarters today.
72 R. ALEXY, Begriff und Geltung des Rechts, Preiburg 1992, p. 201.
73 D. DE SAAVEDRA PAJARDO, Republics lileraris, ed. by J. C. Dc Torres, 
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